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Abstract 
 
  Approach-avoidance theories describe the major systems that motivate 
behaviors in reaction to classes of appetitive (rewarding) and aversive 
(punishing) stimuli. The literature points to two major ‘avoidance’ systems, 
one related to pure avoidance and escape of aversive stimuli, and, a second, to 
behavioral inhibition induced by the detection of goal-conflict (in addition, 
there is evidence for non-affective behavioural constraint). A third major 
system, responsible for approach behavior, is reactive to appetitive stimuli, 
and has several subcomponents. A number of combined effects of these 
systems are outlined. Finally, the hierarchical nature of behavioral control is 
delineated, including the role played by conscious awareness in behavioral 
inhibition 
 
 
 
Keywords: approach, avoidance, behavioral inhibition, constraint, motivation, 
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 Approach-avoidance theories aim to describe the major systems that motivate 
behaviors in reaction to classes of appetitive (rewarding) and aversive (punishing) 
stimuli, and to explain consistent patterns of individual differences in these behaviors. 
Current theories trace their origins to early researchers, especially those learning 
theorists who rejected the Hullian notion of a single drive underlying reinforcement-
based behavior (Hull, 1952). In place of this single factor theory, they pointed to two 
central state (emotion) processes. Mowrer (1960), in particular, was a pioneer in this 
field, and the work of others (e.g., Konorski, 1967) made further significant progress. 
 An important development of this work, especially in terms of its significance 
for human emotion, motivation and learning, came through the work of Jeffrey Gray 
(1970, 1972, 1975, 1982). This work had a major influence on current-day agreement 
that there are a small number of state systems that mediate reactions to different 
classes of reinforcing stimuli (i.e., rewards and punishments of various kinds) and 
which generate emotion and shape (‘motivate’) approach-avoidance behavior. This 
work also led to important links being made between, on the one hand, state systems 
and traits, and on the other hand, psychopathology (e.g., anxiety and depression) as 
well as all varieties of everyday behavior (e.g., gambling, substance abuse, economic 
decisions; for a summary, see Corr, 2008a).  
 Gray’s early work led directly to the ‘reinforcement sensitivity theory’ (RST; 
Gray & McNaughton, 2000; Corr, 2008a), which postulates three major 
neuropsychological systems: One positive, the behavioral approach system (BAS); 
and two negative, the fight-flight-freeze system (FFFS) and the behavioral inhibition 
system (BIS). The BAS is activated by appetitive stimuli (e.g., food and sexual 
partners); the FFFS by aversive stimuli (e.g., predators); and the BIS by conflicting 
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stimuli (e.g., co-activation of FFFS and BAS when their motivational tendencies are 
opposing, as in avoidance-approach conflict seen in many social situations).  
 In terms of definition and operational procedures, the appetitive and aversive 
stimuli which activate these approach-avoidance systems are defined independently of 
the individual under test: They are defined in terms of typical reactions of the vast 
majority of individuals in the population (i.e., in terms of the ‘direction’ of behavior, 
namely to avoid in the case of ‘aversive’ stimuli, and approach in the case of 
‘appetitive’ stimuli). However, there are considerable individual differences in these 
reactions, and these differences comprise the personality bases of approach and 
avoidance motivations (principally, but not exclusively, related to extraversion and 
neuroticism). These reactions are uncomplicated with the use of unambiguous stimuli 
(e.g., a pain inducing shock). However, it should be noted that some stimuli (e.g., a 
conspecific) may elicit different reactions in different people depending on their 
evaluation of the stimulus, for example producing avoidance in some people but 
approach in others. In such cases, it is important to determine the typical ‘direction’ of 
behavior induced by such stimuli and the prevalence of contrary reactions. In other 
words, it is important to determine that ‘aversive’ stimuli are actually punishing and 
‘appetitive’ stimuli are actually rewarding. This requirement is especially important 
when extending animal-based models to human behavior where perception and 
valuation determine in many cases so-called, ‘appetitive’ and ‘aversive’ stimuli: 
These stimuli need to be experimentally validated and not just theoretically assumed. 
 In addition to these considerations, the specific forms of approach-avoidance 
behavior will depend on context and the environment. Some environments afford 
certain forms of behavior. For example, simple avoidance of a threatening stimulus 
may be possible in one environment (e.g., a park with lots of barking dogs), but not in 
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another environment which may call forth a different form of defensive reaction (e.g., 
fleeing or fighting; e.g., being approached at night by an aggressive individual). 
Context, too, is important. For example, in most people an aggressive boss would 
elicit a different reaction than an aggressive stranger; and very often we have to 
inhibit automatic reactions depending on the situation (e.g., fleeing from the sound of 
the dentist’s drill, or getting flustered when giving an oral presentation in front of 
people). Therefore, the rather clinical sounding terms ‘approach’ and ‘avoidance’ 
need to be seen in the light of the affordances and constraints of specific situations. 
This is especially important when assigning motivational functions to these behaviors: 
We cannot simply ‘read-off’ functions from them without considering the specific 
context in which behavior is elicited and observed. 
 As discussed below, the general state systems of the FFFS, BIS and BAS are 
rather well established in the broader research literature – including, animal 
neurophysiology, human experimental and personality. It is these state systems, their 
interactions, and how they differ between individuals, that may be seen to form the 
foundations of the whole family of approach-avoidance theories. However, at this 
stage of knowledge, it needs to be recognised that, although Gray’s approach may be 
a good starting point to work towards a consensual model, much more research is 
needed before any firm conclusions can be reached.  
Foundations of Approach-Avoidance Behavior 
The approach adumbrated by Gray was founded on several tenets. First, that 
emotions (e.g., fear and hope) are central states activated by reinforcing stimuli 
(generally called ‘punishment’ and ‘reward’); and, second, that two major systems 
underpin the activation of these central states, one related to sensitivity/reactivity to 
‘punishment’ and another to ‘reward’. At least in part, individual differences, as 
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expressed in personality traits (e.g., extraversion and neuroticism), reflect long-term 
stabilities in the operation of these state systems. (Space prevents adequate discussion 
of the personality side of approach-avoidance motivation; for discussion, see Corr, 
DeYoung & McNaughton, 2012.) 
 Now, if we define reward and punishment as any stimuli that evokes an 
emotional response then we are getting very close to the inferential hazard, noted 
above. However, this danger may be mitigated: (1) If the definition of ‘reward’ 
includes the termination or omission of punishment (this is the ‘hope = relief’ 
hypothesis), and the definition of ‘punishment’ includes the termination or omission 
of reward (this is the ‘fear = frustration’ hypothesis); and (2) if drugs (e.g., affecting 
dopamine and serotonin systems) are used to dissect the classes of behavior related to 
these ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’ systems. By these means a theory of the central 
states relating to approach-avoidance behavior can be built and, then, empirically 
tested. 
A good example of the potential of falsification of this approach is seen in 
revised RST: In 2000, Gray and McNaughton, rejected the theory of the BIS as one 
related to conditioned aversive stimuli (e.g., a signal of the presentation of a pain-
inducing stimulus), replacing it with a more general one that is sensitive to goal-
conflicts of all kinds (e.g., between approach and avoidance motivation when they are 
in opposition). In addition, this previous version of BIS (Gray, 1982) defined its 
adequate inputs in terms of reactions to stimuli that were preferentially affected by 
anti-anxiety drugs (mainly barbiturates, alcohol and benzodiazepines). This 
association verged on tautology. However, mitigation of this specific inferential 
hazard came with the discovery that anxiety was reduced by the newer classes of anti-
anxiety drugs (e.g., selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, SSRIs), which, also, acted 
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on the septo-hippocampal system, as originally proposed, and which also affected the 
electrocortical signature of BIS activity, namely the theta rhythm (Gray & 
McNaughton, 2000; see Mitchell, McNaughton, Flanagan, & Kirk, 2008).  
Approach/Avoidance Systems, and their Interactions 
In general terms, ‘reward’ stimuli motivate approach behavior, and 
‘punishment’ stimuli motivate avoidance/escape behavior (Gray, 1975).  But, here, 
there are some complexities that any theory must consider. At the state level, reward 
and punishment motivations (approach-avoidance tendencies) subtract from each 
other, and have different goal-gradients (Miller, 1944). And, in addition to these two 
systems, there is a third system of ‘avoidance’: Over and above these subtractive 
effects, the inhibition of approach by approach-avoidance conflict is neurally and 
psychopharamcologically distinct from simple avoidance/escape (Gray, 1982; Gray & 
McNaughton, 2000). In RST parlance, these two ‘avoidance’ motivations are 
controlled by two parallel processes: FFFS and BIS. Whereas the BIS is generally 
sensitive to anxiolytic drugs, the FFFS is relatively insensitive to anxiolytic drugs but 
sensitive to panicolytic ones. 
 Such pharmacological data add support to a crucial point: In plain English, 
‘behavioral inhibition’, if this means a reduction in behavior, is not necessarily 
dependent on the BIS. When reward and punishment are not approximately equal in 
value and are not in conflict, they subtract from each other (Gray & Smith, 1969), and 
resulting reduction in behavior is specifically not affected by anxiolytic drugs 
(McNaughton & Gray, 1983); but when they approximately equal and in conflict then 
the BIS is activated and anxiolytic drugs affect it. In addition, there may be a form of 
‘non-affective constraint’ on behavior reflecting the cortical inhibition of behavior 
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which is independent of the above two forms of behavioral reduction/inhibition 
(Carver, Johnson, & Joorman, 2008). 
Therefore, the processing of conflict and the resultant behavioral inhibition is not 
the same as simple (pure) avoidance, although in both cases it appears that behavior is 
inhibited (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). These different types of avoidance are often 
in opposition to each other: Freezing, fighting and fleeing are all forms of avoidance, 
whereas behavioral inhibition allows cautious approach (or withholding of entry) to a 
dangerous place. We see this opposition in the everyday example of the motivation to 
flee from the dentist’s chair because of the potential pain involved in the procedure 
and the behavioral inhibition, and resulting anxiety, induced by the conflict, namely 
the reward of getting one’s teeth repaired/improved at the same time as the 
unpleasantness of the situation (here, too, we witness the control of behaviour by 
higher-level cognitive processes which allow us to endure the situation because we 
know the outcome will be beneficial). An important implication of this scheme is that, 
in order to study this conflict-related behavioral inhibition proper, it is important first 
to characterise and measure simple approach and avoidance and, then, to compare the 
effects of behavioral inhibition superimposed on these pure forms of approach and 
avoidance. 
Critically, then, when theorists talk about ‘avoidance’, they need to be clear 
whether it is active avoidance (pure avoidance/escape) or passive avoidance (conflict-
related avoidance); and, on top of this, there seems to be a non-affective form of 
constraint on behavior. 
 Separable and joint effects 
 As noted above, an obvious interaction of reward/approach and 
punishment/avoidance is the subtractive effect on choice behavior. One incarnation of 
                                                                           Approach and Avoidance Behavior 9 
this subtractive rule is seen in the case of trait measures of approach-avoidance 
behavior. Based on the original work of Gray & Smith (1969), there is a growing 
literature on the ‘joint subystems hypothesis’ of reward and punishment systems (for a 
summary of empirical studies, see Corr, 2004). Studies indicate that, in predicting 
human reactions to various types of reward and punishment, consideration should be 
given to their combined effects (sometimes revealed by two main effects, at other 
times by statistical interactions). Combined effects are based on two assumptions: (1) 
Most forms of behavior are not pure in the sense that there are varying degrees of 
aversive and appetitive stimuli in the ambient environment; and (2) behavior is often 
the result of the activation of multiple state systems (i.e., systems work together to 
shape the final behavior shown). An everyday example would be performance during 
a job interview which, typically, will be jointly influenced by the positive motivation 
to impress as well as the fear/anxiety of saying the wrong thing and looking foolish or 
incompetent. However, where pure behavior can be assured (e.g., an intense level of 
threat), then separable effects are to be expected. The subtractive effect discussed 
above provides the major theoretical rationale for such combined effects of rewarding 
and punishing stimuli, but there are other possible forms of interaction as discussed 
below.  
Thus, basic animal studies suggest: (a) There are, at least, two ‘avoidance’ 
systems, one for simple active avoidance/escape (FFFS) and one for goal conflict 
(passive avoidance; BIS); and (b) these systems often interact with the reward system 
in a number of ways (e.g., FFFS-BAS, in an subtractive fashion; and BIS-BAS in an 
inhibitory fashion) – although there are a number of possible other interactions, some 
additive, between these systems (e.g., FFFS-related flight to a place of safety would 
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also entail the BAS in a unified action; for a discussion of these relationships, see 
Boureau & Dayan, 2011).  
Approach Behavior and its Components 
 Approach behavior, which is initiated by the presentation of a stimulus that 
is perceived to be rewarding, has received much less theoretical attention than the 
defensive systems discussed above, and there is much still to be done to clarify the 
component processes. Nonetheless, there is good reason to believe that approach 
behavior is multidimensional (Carver & White, 1994).  
 The primary function of the system controlling approach behavior is to 
move the animal up the temporo-spatial gradient, from a start state (e.g., the idea of,  
or the physical distance to a source of food), towards the final biological reinforcer 
(e.g., consumption of food).  To move along the temporo-spatial gradient to the final 
biological reinforcer, some form of ‘sub-goal scaffolding’ is needed (Corr, 2008b). 
This process consists of (a) identifying the biological reinforcer, (b) planning 
behavior, and (c) executing the plan (i.e., ‘problem solving’) at each stage of the 
temporo-spatial gradient. This approach behavior entails a series of sub-processes, 
some of which oppose each other. For example, behavior restraint and planning are 
often required to achieve approach goals (e.g., making arrangements for a holiday), 
but not at the final point of capture of the biological reinforcer (having fun on 
holiday), where non-planning and fast reactions (i.e., impulsivity) are more 
appropriate. As aptly noted by Carver (2005, p. 312), ‘…unfettered impulse can 
interfere with the attainment of longer term goals.’  
 Is there any evidence for the above claims? Well, at the psychometric level, 
there are separate components to BAS approach behavior. In replicated samples, Corr 
& Cooper (2012) found evidence for four sub-factors, comprising ‘reward interest’ 
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and ‘drive-persistence’, that characterise the early stages of approach, and ‘reward 
reactivity’ and ‘impulsivity’, that characterise the behavioral and emotional 
excitement as the final biological reinforcer is reached. Emotion in the former case 
may be termed ‘anticipatory pleasure’ (or ‘hope’); in the latter case something akin to 
an ‘excitement attack’ of high pleasure/joy. This 4-factor model updates Carver and 
White’s (1994) 3-factor model of trait approach behavior. How these separate 
components of the BAS relate, in terms of subtractive, additive, and inhibitory effects, 
to the FFFS and BIS is as yet unknown. 
Hierarchical Control of Automatic and Controlled Processes 
Approach-avoidance behaviour is controlled by a hierarchical system of 
neuropsychological processes, ranging from the reflexive-automatic to the reflective-
controlled (including conscious awareness). In an attempt to tackle this issue, Corr 
(2010) developed a model, based on a neuropsychological model of the functions of 
consciousness (Gray, 2004), which postulates that all behaviors (and related thoughts, 
feeling, etc) are automatically organised and executed, without the immediate control 
by higher-level controlled processes (and certainly not conscious processing which 
simply takes too long to be generated by the brain to have immediate control over the 
events it represents).  
The model states that when everything is ‘going to plan’ (i.e., things are as 
expected), we are not generally aware of on-going events (however, events and 
stimuli that are particularly important for ongoing goals do attract controlled 
processing). It is only at critical junctures (i.e., the expected does not happen) that the 
outputs of processing attract conscious awareness, and these outputs tend to entail 
(goal-conflict) error, usually in the form of actual states of the world departing from 
expected states. For example, whilst driving a car we may find ourselves braking hard 
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and only then realise why we braked – that is, we are conscious of the error only after 
it has occurred and only after the brain has executed the appropriate (reflexive-
automatic) response (Figure 1).  
The proximal-distal aspects of threat are of importance too, as is the level of 
intensity. High intensity threat in the context of goal-conflict would quickly resolve 
itself in the form of FFFS-related behaviour. But when threats are less intense or 
perceived to be distant in terms of space or time then BIS-related processing allows 
the individual to engage in approach behavior but in a much more cautious and risk-
aversive manner. Thus, when threats are intense and immediate, automatic processing 
dominants; but when threats are less intense and not immediate, then controlled 
processes are activated to risk assess the problem situation. It is assumed that stimuli 
associated with error enter conscious awareness where they are replayed for detailed 
analysis; and, after this analysis, the automatic neural-behavioral machinery that 
controls behavior at any given moment is (re)adjusted so that future behavior is more 
appropriate when the same set of stimuli, which led to the error signal, are 
encountered again. By this means, we learn from our mistakes and the machinery that 
control our automatic behavior is better prepared when it encounters a similar 
situation next time (e.g., we no longer flinch so readily at the sight of an attacking 
shark at a 3-D movie). A failure to adjust our behavior on the basis of past experience 
is generally seen as highly maladaptive and indicative of a problem of control (e.g., a 
losing gambler chasing their losses). 
 
------------------------ 
Figure 1 about here 
------------------------ 
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 Fight/Anger 
 The above model of behavioral control may help to explain the problem of 
how fight/anger relates to the approach-avoidance systems. Basic animal research 
indicates that predatory, or instrumental, fight should be associated with the BAS; 
however, when it is of a defensive nature it should be associated with the FFFS as its 
function is to remove the animal from the source of a high intensity and immediate 
threat (e.g., cat to rat), especially when other forms of escape are not available. When 
cornered by a predator, animals do fight-back, and the same is often seen in human 
behavioral reactions in a comparable situation. Thus, conceptually, and in behavioral 
terms, defensive fight should be expected to be part of the FFFS. But there is now a 
growing literature to show that fight/anger is more associated with the BAS (Carver & 
Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, 2003). This literature seems to point to several 
relevant issues in extending animal-based models to human research, as well as 
highlighting the importance of the general form of the behavioral control model 
shown in Figure 1. 
First, it may be difficult to distinguish reactive, defensive aggression 
(controlled by FFFS) from instrumental aggression (controlled by the BAS) – 
language may simply fail to differentiate the psychological states of each type. 
Secondly, because aggression involves behavioral activation, even when defensive, 
this is a case in which the sensitivity of multiple systems is likely to be important, and 
thus the fight component of the FFFS is likely to be potentiated by the BAS. Thirdly, 
for defensive fight, low base rates may be a problem (at least in the population who 
tend to take part in psychology studies), if items that describe behaviors are 
manifested very infrequently in normal human life. Lastly, measurement of fight 
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might be best achieved by a behavioral measure, not a questionnaire one, especially if 
it represents a form of automatic, prepotent, reaction to a high intensity, and 
inescapable, threat. This last possibility is likely to be of considerable importance 
across the whole range of approach-avoidance behaviors. For this reason, all forms of 
approach-avoidance behavior should be defined in terms of overt reactions to 
experimentally controlled stimuli in addition to any attempt to measure them by 
questionnaire. 
Conclusions 
Research over many decades points to, at least, two major system of avoidance: 
Pure avoidance/escape and conflict-related behavioral inhibition (and possibly a third, 
non-affective, form of constraint); and, on the reward side, a multi-component 
incentive system that is responsible for mediating the complex cascade of responses 
from speculative appetitive exploration to capture of the biological reward. These 
systems interact in a number of, sometimes complex, ways to influence behavior. 
Long-term stabilities in these systems comprise the foundations of personality traits. 
Important too are hierarchical behavioral control processes, including the exotica of 
conscious awareness. It may be this wider panorama that is of ultimate importance, 
especially in our attempts to integrate approach-avoidance theories within the larger 
psychological landscape.  
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Figure Caption 
 
Figure 1. Information processing diagram of the functioning of the behavioral 
inhibition system (BIS) in automatic and controlled processing modes, which 
contains basic reward:approach and punishment:avoidance processes, as well as 
goal-conflict device related to the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS).  Behavioral 
plans (Plans) lead to predictions (Prediction Generator; 1) of future states of the 
world, which receives input from (2a), and sends output to (2b), stored previous 
experience (Memory). The BIS (Goal-State Comparator) receives input from the 
Prediction Generator (3), and then compares the response-reinforcement outcomes 
(World: Actual State) with predictions (4), and then one of two things happen: (a) 
‘everything is going to plan’, and the BIS Goal-State Comparator sends input to 
the Prediction Generator to continue the motor program (‘just checking mode’; 5); 
or (b) the BIS Goal-State Generator detects a mismatch between prediction and 
outcome and generates an error signal ( ), which leads to activation of the BIS 
and controlled processes (6).  
 Once the BIS is activated, there is inhibition of the reward:approach system 
(BAS; 7a) and the punishment:avoidance system (FFFS; 7b); and at this time the 
BIS initiates cautious behavior and risk assessment, which then informs Plans (8), 
which simultaneously receives input, about current states, from the BAS and 
FFFS (9a, b), as well as input, about the nature of the conflict, from the BIS Goal-
State Comparator (10). Plans initiate appropriate behavior and the above cycle is 
repeated, until behavioral resolution is achieved in the form of punishment-related 
avoidance/escape or reward-related approach.  
 
